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Not on my network!  
App exclusion and the net 
neutrality debate 
 
The net neutrality debate is at its peak. 
On January 27, the Dutch Authority for 
Competition and Markets (DACM) fined 
KPN and Vodafone for the first violation 
of the Dutch net neutrality law ever.
i
 On 
February 26, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) 
approved new regulations for broadband 
internet, preserving the net neutrality.
ii
 In 
brief, the net neutrality proponents seem 
to be winning the debate. In a recent 
economic paper, Sébastien Broos and 
Axel Gautier
iii
 analyze whether this 
toughened stance of regulatory 
authorities is the best way forward. 
 
They focus specifically on the two types 
of infringements that have been fined by 
the DACM. Firstly, the exclusion by 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of 
applications competing with their own 
bundle of products, a typical example 
being VoIP applications.   These apps 




essential complements are couples of 
goods (internet and the app), one (the 
internet) being essential for the other 
(the app) to work while the second (the 
app) adds value to the first.  KPN was 
fined for banning VoIP applications 
from its Wifi hotspot network. The 
second focus is price discrimination 
between app users and non-app users.  
Vodafone was fined by the DACM for 
offering some apps and the associated 
content for free, thereby making de facto 
the price of internet services different 
according to usage.
v




S é b a s t i e n  B r o o s  
PhD C and ida t e ,   
LC II  &  HEC -U Lg   
sbroo s@ul g .ac .b e  
             &   
A x e l  G a u t i e r   
Pro fes so r ,   
LC II  &  HEC -U Lg   
agau t i e r@ulg . ac .be  
 
 
 Competing one-way essential complements: the forgotten side of net neutrality? 
The LCII Policy Brief is a quarterly publication. It can be downloaded from www.lcii.eu  
 
2 
The paper focuses on three simple 
questions: (1) is it optimal for the ISPs to 
exclude competing apps?  (2) If not, is it 
optimal to have a special tariff for using 
these apps and (3) is it welfare 
improving to prohibit exclusion and 
price surcharge?   
 
To answer this question, Broos and 
Gautier develop a model with three 
goods: the internet, the phone and a 
VoIP app (thereafter “the app”), with the 
phone and the app being differentiated 
products. The phone works on its own 
but the app needs the internet to 
function. The internet and the app are 
thus one-way essential complements. 
 
They consider first a monopoly ISP 
selling the internet and the phone. App 
exclusion creates two competing effects. 
First, there is a business stealing effect, 
the app steals revenue from the phone 
business of the ISP because some 
consumers switch from the phone to the 
app. Secondly, there is a 
complementarity effect, the app creates 
value for internet users who are then 
ready to pay more for the internet when 
applications are available. Broos and 
Gautier show that by appropriately 
rebalancing the price of the phone and 
the internet services, the 
complementarity effect more than 
compensates the business stealing effect. 
For that, the ISP should raise the price of 
the essential good (the internet) to 
extract the extra surplus consumers 
obtain by using the app.  For the ISP, it 
is therefore not profitable to exclude the 
app. More than that, profits can be 
increased by asking consumers for a 
surcharge to enable access to the app. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the firms’ 
and consumers’ interests are aligned: 
imposing net neutrality, that is forcing 
ISPs to stop the surcharges, decreases 
both profits and consumer surplus. 
 
They consider next competing ISPs.  
Competition between ISPs drives down 
prices and profits on the internet and the 
phone markets. Therefore, the business 
stealing effect of the app is much less 
important.  But, the complementarity 
effect remains.   The paper shows that 
full exclusion of the app by all ISPs is 
never an issue.  Should one ISP exclude 
the app, the other will offer it to benefit 
from the complementarity effect.  
However, there exists an equilibrium in 
which the internet is fragmented
vi
, 
meaning that the app is made available 
only at one ISP.   Partial exclusion of the 
app thus becomes an issue when ISPs 
compete.
vii
 When the internet is 
fragmented, the ISP offering the app 
benefits from the complementarity effect 
only if it can price discriminate and ask a 
surcharge for using the app.  Finally, 
Broos and Gautier show that prohibiting 
exclusion and price discrimination i.e. 
implementing net neutrality, acts as a 
competition intensifier leading to lower 
prices. This benefits consumers but not 
always welfare.    
 
The paper shows that net neutrality rules 
are not useful when there is no 
competition between ISPs. With 
competition, a likely outcome of a non-
neutral internet is a fragmented internet 
where all the apps are not made available 
everywhere. Competing ISPs have 
incentives to differentiate themselves by 
offering exclusive content on their 
network.  The welfare impact of a 
fragmented internet is not always clear-
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cut and it certainly depends on the 
degree of competition between app 
providers, an issue that is not yet 
considered in the paper of Broos and 
Gautier. The net neutrality debate is still 
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